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ABSTRACT
Centrifugal pressures and the ‘technical needs of the modern state’ (Keating) resulted in
demands for decentralization from the seventies on. Nowadays, regional self-government
exists in many EU member states. This has strengthened the position of the regions, not only
within the member states, but even within the EU itself. Some of the elements that play a role
are: [1] The dynamics of European integration resulted in a significant increase in
competences for the
EC (in the meanwhile EU). However, it appears that most of the integration at the European
level occured in those domains which had already been transferred to a regional authority in
several member states. As a result, regions play an increasingly important role in the
implementation of EU regulations which makes them want to have a say in how these are
formed. [2] The EMU will enhance cross-border cooperation between regions. Regions will
propose their policies more on their own, apart from the traditional states. [3] The European
regional policy has become increasingly important, with the structural funds as main
instruments. Attention is paid to this policy, especially in the light of the expansion of the EU
to the east and the reforms that come with this (cfr. Agenda 2000). Regions will claim a more
decisive participation in the regional policy making. [4] Regions found their claims for an
increased influence upon the EU-treaty which stipulates that ‘decisions should be taken as
closely as possible to the citizen’. This paper stresses the regions use of the principle as an
argument for increased influence.
As integration advances, regions will gradually become more autonomous partners in the
European project. This paper focuses on the determinants of this process and the challenges
that will come together with future developments. One argument that will be developped is
the unlikeliness that this evolution will lead to a Europe of the regions, in which regions will
totally replace the traditional states. However, new institutional settings will be needed to
formalize the role of the regions.ON-GOING  EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL AFFECT THE POSITION OF THE
REGIONS:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS AND SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR
THE FUTURE
HENDRIK VOS
The European Union is facing a number of very important challenges, of which the
enlargement and the establishment of an economic and monetary union seem to be the most
important ones in the near future. However, these challenges are in no case the only ones.
Every step towards further integration has implications on several levels. The position of the
regions, which sometimes are labelled as the ‘basic units’ of the Union, will be affected by
this integration process. Even more: the position of the regions can not be evaluated without
taking the European integration into consideration. Their meaning and their future will depend
highly on this integration process.
This point of view leads us to some important questions. Are regions just geographical
defined areas, useful for an efficient allocation of structural funds to the most deprived areas,
but without any real political or economical meaning other than a statistical meaning? Or are
the regions (becoming) real basic units of this European Union, the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle
of which the Union is composed? Do they have power and, if so, how? And above all: in
which direction is the position of the regions moving?
To answer these questions systematically, I will proceed as follows:
First I will take a short look at the dynamics in which the regions have been trapped during
the last couple of years and decades in part 1. Then I will transfer the main conclusions of
these dynamics to future steps in the integration process in part 2. This approach makes it
possible to gain a medium term understanding of the perspectives of the European regions:
not only their capacities and opportunities but even the problems and the obstacles they will
have to face. In the conclusion, I will deal with the crucial problem of institutional settings
that will be needed to formalize the role of the regions.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGIONS SO FAR
The preamble of the Treaty of Rome already brings up the regions: problems of uneven
regional development and the backwardness of the less favoured regions are mentioned.
However, no concrete proposals to reduce the differences have been suggested and no specific
reference was made to the establishment of a common regional policy. Initially, it was
assumed that the combination of economical integration and the hidden hand of the free
market would lead to an economical convergence between the regions.
This proved to be wrong: integration did not seem to have the intended equalizing effect. It
became clear that a lot of the problems that arised out of the restructuration and
dismantlement of e.g. coal and steel industry, had a strong regional dimension. Despite the
economic boom of the sixties, backwarded regions had no prospects without extensive
economic support, even in the more prosperous states.
Besides, the monetary union became an important theme in the debate about Europe’s future
in the seventies. It was clear that significant geographical variations in the level of
development would seriously complicate this project, if not make it unfeasible. As a
consequence some specifically region-oriented structures and bodies have been added to the
European construction. In 1967 a Directorate-Generale XVI — the department of the
European Commission responsible for Community action to reduce the gaps in socio-
economic development between the various regions of the Union — was established. The
European Fund for Regional Development
1, founded in 1975, was another important pillar.
The Single European Act (1986) mentioned for the first time the importance of an effective
regional economic policy. From then on the regional policy competences of the European
Commission will extend gradually. However, the development of a real common regional
policy remained problematic as the member states were not willing to give up their control
over this policy (especially over the financing of it).
During the eighties, the Commission (and the European Parliament) realized that a greater
involvement of the regions became inevitable, a.o. because of the fact that the regional
projects had to be implemented in the regions themselves and even by the regions themselves.
Hence the Commission established a Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities
in 1988. For the first time, regions were formally introduced in the Union’s decision making
process, albeit with very restricted competences. Simultaneously the regions assertiveness
grew and they began to organize themselves. This regional mobilization (Pongy, Saez
1994:  11) resulted in the creation of pressure groups for defending the general regional
interests. These agitated a.o. for the regions having more of a say in the allocation of thestructural funds
2. Furthermore a number of regional cooperations were established between
adjacent regions that have specific problems and interests
3 and between non-adajacent regions
whith similar (mostly economic) interests
4. Many regional authorities have set up a so-called
‘regional information office’ (a euphemism for a pressure group) in Brussels as an attempt to
influence the European decision making process (Greenwood 1997:  218-241; Smets
1997:  206-208). Michael Keating (1995: 14) stipulates that by 1989, representation in
Brussels included all ten West German Länder and West Berlin; four Spanish regions, six
French regions and two departments; and four British local authorities. This number has
undoubtedly grown since: Justin Greenwood (1997: 227-228) distinguished in April 1996 135
different regions with a direct representation in Brussels.
It is important to stress that the word ‘region’ originally was used for depressed and needy
areas, but that these areas have become more assertive. Now, they stand up for themselves
and recently even became involved in the regional economic policy, though still in a very
restricted way.
From the seventies on, a second and new dynamics can be detected: some form of regionalism
has been introduced in a many member states. Within this paper it is not possible to examine
this matter in detail, but two main elements must however be pointed out:
To begin with, there is the rise of the regionalist theme with a strongly mobilizing power all
over Europe. Regionalist feelings can be observed in the cultural life (a renaissance of
regional languages, a revival of regional cultural movements, increasing interest in the old
culture and its traditional expressions, …) ánd in the political field (the rise or rebirth of
regionalist parties, segregation movements, …). Popular demand for decentralization is not
confined to any specific type of region (e.g. only the poor ones, or the rich ones, or the ones
with ethnical minorities, etc.). A second element that favours regionalism is to be found in
what Keating (1985: 2) calls the “technical needs of the modern state”. As early as in 1972,
Rupert B. Vance (1972: 379) stated in the prestigious International encyclopedia of the social
sciences, that “[i]f territorial groups did not exist, political organization would have to call
them into being in order to function.”. Recently, others expressed similar views in the
discussion about the subsidiarity principle
5. For reasons of efficiency, it seems to be
appropriate to give some authority to territorial units at a lower level under the central
government. Especially central governments of larger countries lack the information for
effective policy making (or implementation of this policy) in regional matters.In an article on
devolution in Scotland, The Economist (20 sept. 1997: 37) was very clear: “If there is a turn-
of-the-century message in Europe, it may be ‘devolve or die’.”Whatever caused this process a decentralization process can be detected in most of the
member states of the European Union. Whether this is called devolution, regionalization or
federalization is less important because these terms only describe different stages of the same
process. In many of the member states regions have gained executive competences and often
legislative competences as well.
At the same time European integration accelerated: the ‘field of activity’ of the Community
(in the meanwhile Union) has been extended substantially, because of the Single European
Act and the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. These new competences, however, had in a
number of member states already been transfered to the regions (transport, education,
environment, culture, labour, public health, vocational training, …). This leads to a paradox:
on the one hand, one can get the impression that the regions have to give back almost
immediately what they just had achieved (boldly said: the heads of state are ‘selling out’ to
Europe what they already handed over to their regions). Especially the German Länder
experienced this as a major problem after Maastricht, and this protest contributed to
Germany’s reserved attitude towards the integration process in Amsterdam. On the other
hand, it is precisely this Europeanization of regional matters which leads to a more intense
involvement of the regions in the European integration. Nowadays they are responsible for the
implementation of European rules which leads them to claim a bigger involvement in the
construction of these rules and regulations. Marc Cogen (1990: 36) stipulates that when
regions do not have a say in the accomplishment of European rules, they will carry out these
rules tardily or deficiently.
In other words: as regions (even those with only executive powers) are becoming responsible
for the implementation of European decisions, they have a power which should not be
underestimated. This situation can only lead to a more intense involvement of the regions in
European decision making. In a resolution on the common regional policy and the role of the
regions and in a charter, the European parliament in 1988 already pleaded for a more decisive
role for the regions and for an institutionalization of the democratic representation of the
regions at the European level.
Summarizing, one can say that over the past few years an important change has occured:
regions are no longer merely treated in terms of economic backwardness. This understanding
resulted in the establishment of a Committee of the Regions in the Maastricht Treaty. The
tasks of this Committee are not limited to regional economic policy, but to all matters which
could possibly concern the regions. Some aspects of this Committee will be analysed further
on.The combination of the two outlined processes — [1]  an increasingly important regional
policy that is aimed at reducing economic gaps and [2] regions becoming directly involved in
European decision making process due to a combination of the regionalization in the member
states and an extension of the ‘field of activity’ of the Union — results in the fact that regions
have become important during the last decades, that they have organized themselves and that
they became more assertive. Such is the situation today. The next question is about the sort of
challenges the Union is facing at the moment and how these will affect the regions.
2 THE CHALLENGES FOR THE UNION AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGIONS
Regions have gained importance throughout a substantial number of European states. In some
states (e.g. the United Kingdom) the power of the regions is still increasing, elsewhere the
new relations will at least be consolidated. A tendency to deprive the regions of their
competences is nowhere to be detected. When discussing the position of the regions in
Europe, it is important to remember that within the traditional states their positions seem to
hold.
Below, I will discuss some short term challenges to the European Union with repercussions
on the regions. Following topics will be dealt with: a further extension of the ‘field of
activity’ of the Union (or at least the further realization of the decisions taken in Maastricht
and Amsterdam), the establishment of a single European currency, the expansion of the Union
to the east and the call for more democracy.
2.1 EXTENSION OF THE ‘FIELD OF ACTIVITY’ OF THE UNION
As a consequence of the dynamics of European integration the competences of the European
Community (now European Union) increased significantly. As I stated above, it seems that
most of the integration occurred in those domains which had already been transferred to a
regional authority in several member states
6. Even if integration does not advance anymore
and remains limited to the implementation of Maastricht and Amsterdam decisions, it is clear
that European bodies (such as Council or Commission) will increasingly enter on the regional
domains. However, even without a blind faith in the functionalist spill-over mechanism it can
be assumed that their competences will continue to increase.
As stated above, regions will claim influence over how the decisions are taken, because they
are responsible for the implementation of important aspects of the new decisions, rules andregulations. Christian Engel and Jef Van Ginderachter (1993: 55) refer to studies on the
increasing readiness of accepting and administering of laws if there are possibilities to
participate in the decision making process. Whoever can influence this process will not be
confronted with decisions which are perceived as unilaterally imposed. Whether or not the
existing institutional settings will be able to deal with these demands remains uncertain. For
the moment, regions do have two formal instruments for direct influence on the European
policy
7: first, there is the Committee of the Regions and, second, there is article 146 EC which
allows the possibility for a regional minister to be a member of the Council. These facilities
became part of the Treaty in Maastricht.
Let me start with the Committee of the Regions. This Committee is in fact only a consultative
body but the Council or the Commission can ignore an opinion of the Committee without
having to justify this. In some tricky matters (e.g. the common agriculture policy) the
Comittee’s opinion is not even mandatory. At the Amsterdam Summit, the Committee was
lobbying for more powers by trying to increase the regional participation. These attempts
failed: the advisory powers have been extended but the real political scope remained low (Vos
1997). Jones (1995: 295) warnes that “[f]or many critics the Committee of the Regions could
degenerate into yet another European talking shop”. Even the fact that the Committee consists
of regional ánd local authorities is seen as problematic. This will be discussed further on.
Then there is article 146 EC: due to the awareness that some matters primarily affect regions
instead of states, the heads of states and governments decided in Maastricht to create a
procedure which makes it possible for a regional minister to be a member of the Council
(instead of a national minister). However, some states would not accept a restriction of their
powers in favour of their regions. This resulted in a compromise text which states that the
Council shall consist of a representative of each member state at ministerial level, authorized
to commit the government of that member state (and not only of that region). In other words:
a Flemish minister has to defend the Belgian point of view in the Council and the five Belgian
votes in the Council can in no way be divided (e.g. 2 Flemish votes, 2 Walloon votes and 1
Brussels vote). The regional ministers may have a moral satisfaction from being with the
happy few around the negotiation table but one cannot speak of a real regional representation
as they are not entitled to voice their region’s opinion. Moreover, the decision to allow the use
of this facility is taken by the member states themselves.
One has to conclude that regions are more involved in the implementation of European Union
rules and (due to this fact) are asking for influence over the European decision making
process, but that the existing opportunities for participation are experienced as insufficient.2.2 A SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY
The realization of the monetary union will have major consequences for the regions. In this
article, I will not take up the economical aspects of the EMU (Will the introduction of the
single currency reduce regional disparities in GDP? Is a single monetary policy likely to lead
to an increasing specialization of regions?  …). Opinions of experts are divided on these
issues.
The EMU will affect the regions on the political level as well. First, there is a more general
point: the traditional state will have less substance as monetary policy will not be the business
of these traditional states anymore (in reality, many states already transferred their monetary
policy making to the German Central Bank). In its wake, certain aspects, such as the fiscal
policy, could follow.
Secondly, it can be assumed that the euro will present new opportunities for the regions as the
(already existing) cross-border and interregional cooperation presumably will intensify. Fixed
rates will reduce exchange and transaction costs. In border regions especially, this, in
combination with consumer advantages such as more transparent price-setting, will have
significant implications. Neighbouring regions from different states will be integrated in one
market and cross-border agreements will have to be arranged.
In fact, the establishment of the EMU will mainly break down barriers. The introduction of a
single currency will make it more easy to a number of regions (in particular the border
regions) to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy and define their economical and
political priorities in function of those of their neighbours. Indirectly, this can lead to a more
independent position in relation to the central states and certainly to a more assertive attitude
of the regions.
2.3 EXPANSION OF THE UNION TO THE EAST
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Union will probably be extended. The
consequences of this extension will be huge and already today plenty of preparations are
made. In Agenda 2000, the European Commission outlines the broad outlook for the
development of the European Union and its policies beyond the turn-of-the-century. Special
attention is given to the impact of the enlargement on the Union as a whole and to the
financial aspects of this operation. As the immense impact on the regions is already obvious
today, the Committee of the Regions tries to follow the debate and the negotiations with
special attention. I will discuss three aspects:
First, there are the structural funds which were intended to eliminate regional disparities. The
financial provisions for this policy have been growing (cfr. supra) and the Commission urgesfor more effectiveness and a simplification of the structural measures. According to the
Commission, the priority policy goal remains economic and social cohesion by reducing
uneven development, as set out explicitly in Article 130a of the Treaty. The prospect of
enlargement with new countries that have widely diverging levels of development, makes this
even more necessary than before. However, the activities of the structural funds will be
reorganized entirely. All resources would go to the east when no radical adjustments are
made. After all, the entry into the Union of relatively poor countries and regions will have two
effects: more regions will claim support (the German unification was a clear example) and the
GDP/capita of the Union as a whole will decrease. This will influence the distribution of the
means from the Cohesion Fund: currently support from this fund can be claimed by states
with a GDP/capita that is less than 90% of the European average. A substantial decrease in the
Union’s GDP/capita could cut off the access to (some of) the four countries, which are
benefiting from this fund up till now. In short, a common regional policy with the present
criteria and philosophy will be an enormeous financial resource for the regions from the new
member states, while regions which are already belonging to the Union will almost certainly
be eliminated from support. Such will undoubtedly be refused by the present member states
and by their regions as well. As a consequence regions are trying to influence the revision of
the (very lucrative) structural policy, in a formal way (Committee of the Regions) and in an
informal way (the regional pressure groups). Furthermore, they will try to seize this
opportunity to gain more influence over the further management of the structural funds. Even
the Commission is arguing for decentralization in the implementation of the common regional
policy and for a clear division of responsabilities.
Secondly, the new member states will have to be divided into regions. Most of them have
done this already a.o. for statistical purposes, but an exact division can still be a matter of
discussion. Many Eastern European states have problems with ethnical minorities and even
the splitting of Czechoslovakia as well as the disintegration of Yugoslavia have shattered the
illusion of stable borders. Tracing borders almost never satisfies all parties and can easily
result in abuses: in order to be a rightful claimant for European structural support, it may be
sufficient for a relatively prosperous region to extend the frontier and incorporate a
backwarded area so the average GDP/capita will go under the defined limits. The lack of a
clear method to divide an area into regions, keeps this kind of gerrymandering possible. Until
today, the European institutions did not propose criteria for defining the regions. The exact
delineation of the regions can thus lead to controverses. This does not have to take place in a
virulent atmosphere, but still some Eastern European regions will insist on their border ánd
plead for more autonomy (Anderson 1996: 56-74; Brubaker 1996; Cuthbertson, Leibowitz(eds.) 1993; Wilson 1994: 408-410). In that case the whole issue may end up on the European
negotiation tables, where European decision makers will enter into a very complex debate
with not only the national authorities but with the regional authorities as well. This debate will
centre on the question of criteria to be used for the division of an area into regions.
Finally there is a third, more indirect, consequence of the enlargement for the regions. It needs
no explaining —  and the Agenda 2000 takes away any doubt  — that intergovernmental
decision making with 20 or more member states is unrealistic. The Commission is arguing for
an extension of the qualified majority vote in the Council, which means that the member
states’ veto will be curtailed. This is another restriction of the power of the traditional states,
while the powers of the regions remain as they are. The indirect effect is that there is a
relative increase in importance for the regions as the weight of states decreases.
2.4 THE CALL FOR MORE DEMOCRACY
These days, there is a growing awareness that the democratic image of Europe has to be
boosted. The European Parliament, a democratically elected institution, is gradually gaining
authority, allthough several opinion polls still point out that there is a gap between the citizens
and Europe. The regions want to play their part in reducing this gap. The Committee of the
Regions refers quite often to article A of the Treaty which stipulates that “decisions are taken
as closely as possible to the citizen.” This article is often combined with the principle of
subsidiarity (mentioned in article B of the Treaty). However, there is no unambiguous
interpretation of this principle. Whenever the subsidiarity principle appears in the Treaty, the
regions are not mentioned. Article 3b EC just states that “in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects
of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.” Moreover, subsidiarity as a
primarily federal principle is not accepted by every signing party. On the contrary, a number
of states (not just the United Kingdom!) interpret this principle as a consolidation of the
traditional state level. The vague terminology made it possible indeed for the principle to
obtain a prominent place in the Treaty, but it remains a principle without any substance. So
far, regions did not succeed to gain a more prominent place in the European construction on
account of this principle.
Besides this there is an even more fundamental problem: regions tend to interpret the widely
accepted principle that decisions are to be taken as closely as possible to the citizen in a mere
geographical way. The Committee of the Regions did not hesitate to conclude hastily that“local and regional governments, by their closeness to the citizens, enhance the
democratization process of Europe.” (Committee of the Regions 1996: 7)
8. It should however
be obvious that ‘closely to the citizen’ can not equal to an authority on every corner of the
street. The organization of governance on a lower level (e.g. local councils and authorities)
does  not imply a smaller gap, a more substantial involvement of the citizens, more
possibilities for real participation or a closer tie between the ruled and the ruler. Neither are
forms of local government in any case more democratic than governance on a larger scale
(nor, for the sake of the argument, less democratic). It should be reminded that richer regions
justify regionalization with arguments of ‘democratization’ and ‘responsabilization’ while the
reason for their actions actually is getting rid of the responsabilities they have for a weaker
region.
Finally, for a refinement of my argument, two more points have to be made: the hesitation I
have to accept a narrow geographical interpretation of ‘closely to the citizen’ does not
necessarily mean that regionalization never offers opportunities for more democracy. It is
conceivable that more participation in cultural or educational policy is possible if these are not
centrally organized. It could be worth to quote Robert Dahl (1970: 101) here: “We need
associations of different dimensions, for different puposes”.
The second point deals with the fact that the democracy argument is nowadays very popular
for asking more power. It can be questioned as the regions real motives often are less noble,
but nevertheless, the regions use the argument for claiming more competences. This can push
the higher authorities towards more attention for the regions.
3 CONCLUSION
The situation at this point is as follows: regions want to have more of a say within the
European construction ánd they are effectively gathering power. Taking all of the above into
consideration, these conclusions can made:
[1] Regions are increasingly involved in the integration process and they are responsible for
the implementation of European Union rules;
[2] The common regional policy, aimed at reducing economical gaps between the regions,
will continue to extend and will be thoroughly restructured. Regions are fully aware of the
fact that their interests are at stake. They are following these restructuration talks very closely
and they try to influence them formally and informally;[3]  The opportunities for cross-border cooperation are increasing. The establishment of a
single currency will even more facilitate a more or less autonomous regional policy in these
matters;
[4] The traditional states are losing power: due to the establisment of the euro and (indirectly)
to the enlargement, competences will be transferred to Europe. Conversely there is no loss of
power for the regions. On the contrary: regions are consolidating their competences within the
member states or are even trying to extend them.
It is obvious to conclude that regions have become important partners in the European Union
and that there is no opposite tendency. Accordingly, they will seek for more formal
participation in the European decision making process. This situation leads to the idea in
some minds of a Europe of the regions. Its exact meaning, however, remains often unclear
and is rarely explicated. Nevertheless, it is often about the idea of a new political and
administrative organization in which the regions will gradually replace the traditional states at
the negotiation tables. Since the eighties, the notion has become a very popular theme in
political speeches and in academic writings. However, this kind of Europe will not be realized
immediately because practical and fundamental obstacles arise between today’s reality and
this picture of the future.
One obstacle is persistence on the use of the intergovernmental principle of decision making
in a number of essential matters. When taking only practical reasons into consideration, it is
obviously impossible to maintain this procedure with dozens of regions around the table. Too
many veto rights would make the system impossible to work. A Europe of the regions would
as a consequence imply an acceleration of the integration process as never before. With the
coming enlargement the intergovernmental approach is allready under pressure and in some
matters this approach will have to be dropped. It is however very unlikely that a sudden
turnover towards a truly federal system (a conditio sine qua non for an operational Europe of
the regions) will occur.
Even other obstacles exist. The fact that the Committee of the Regions did not succeed in
gaining more substantial powers at the Amsterdam Summit (16/17th of june, 1997) can be
considered as an omen. With the European Parliament as an example, the Committee keeps
on hoping to gradually gain more powers in order to become at last a real and powerful
institution. But this Committee finds itself in an impasse: it is impossible to provide a more
influential position to an arbitrarily composed body, in which it is highly unclear who is who
(Vos 1997). The profound confusion about the question what constitutes a region is really
problematic.To begin with, Europe can be divided into regions in a lot of ways. The NUTS-classification,
used by Eurostat (the Union’s statistical office) and the Commission, is only one of the
alternatives
9. Moreover, the regions can never be considered as equal partners. Whatever
criterium is used to mark out the regions, there will always be substantial variations in size of
the population, scale, economical capacity, … Theoretically, this should not be a problem
(e.g. Luxemburg and Germany are, at least formally, partners with an equal status in the
European Union), but there will nevertheless be very drastical differences between the regions
in their competences, in their financial resources, in the ways in which they execute their
powers, in the possibilities they have to enforce their laws, in their relationships with the
central state, … This problem of definition is also mentioned by Michael Newman: “Such
differences between the size and power of regions do not constitute a serious problem for the
EU in current circumstances. While the Committee of the Regions is purely advisory the
arbitrary nature of its representation can be tolerated. Similarly, other governments can accept
Belgian or German regional representatives in the Council of Ministers as long as these
simply act as substitutes for ministers from central government. However, if the Committee of
the Regions were to allocate resources, or if regional governments secured decision making
powers within the EU that were additional to those exercised by central government, the
definition of a region would become a very significant problem.” (Newman 1997: 128-129;
italics in orig.)
As long as it is not sufficiently clear which requirements and criteria have to be met by an
area to be called a ‘region’, it remains extremely vague who is representing or committing
whom in the Committee. These days, the Committee is an extraordinarily varied group of
people with members (from the local as well as from the regional level) that are nominated by
the member states: Belgium has delegated only regional representatives, Luxemburg has
nominated merely local delegates, some states have sent mayors of their big cities
(Copenhagen, Helsinki, Barcelona,  …), while France opted a.o. for those of small and
medium sized cities
10.
No matter which regional umbrella is established, it will always be composed very
asymmetrically even if local representatives are excluded: what kind of delegation could be
sent by Greece or the Netherlands  to meet the strong German Länder or the Belgian
delegation (with regions and so-called communities)? Providing such a diverse body with
important competences will never be tolerated by those countries without any real regional
structures.
Moreover, the reality is that the Union is still very tightly controlled and dominated by the
traditional states. The more centralistically organized amongst them will only be willing togrant the regions those powers which are necessary to guarantee the well-functioning of the
Union, but nothing more. Regionalists should not have high expectations: the member states,
such as France, the United Kingdom or even Germany will never accept the kind of
regionalism where their fate is determined by Bretons, Catalans, Scots or Flemings. In a study
about the Committee of the Regions, Christian Mestre (1997: 83; own translation) does not
harbour any illusions. He finishes his article as follows: “A full recognition of the Committee
of the Regions, is lifting the regions and the localities on the European scene. This situation is
unthinkable to those states which are strongly controlling the Union so far.”.
In the discussion on the place of the regions in the European construction there will be the
quite naive picture of a new political order based on a mythical Europe of the regions on the
one hand, and a (meanwhile outdated) total negation of the regional fact on the other hand.
If ever the Europe of the regions becomes reality, it will be close to the definition of Andrew
Heywood (1997: 98), course director for politics at Orpington College, “meaning that regional
institutions and groups [are] increasingly [seeking] direct access to EU bodies, thereby
bypassing national governments.”.
A major challenge for the next couple of years will be the search for an adequate institutional
setting in which regions will have opportunities for participation and competences required
for an efficient functioning of the Union. This challenge cannot be postponed indefinitely
under the pretext of other developments that have to be faced first, as these challenges and
other developments are interwoven, as pointed out above.
As they are responsible for the implementation of Union rules, regions must be given the
opportunity to participate in the creation of (some aspects of) those rules. But so far, there are
no appropriate structures for this. The power of the regions has increased drastically in the
past decades, but the institutional settings did not follow: there was the establishment of a
fuzzily composed Committee, but it received very limited and only consultative competences.
In the Agenda 2000, the Commission argues that well before the year 2000 (before the first
enlargement) institutional reforms have to be completed. Some knots have to be cut, such as
the weighting of votes in the Council and the reduction in the number of members of the
Commission. This may proove to be a good opportunity to give the regions an appropriate
place in the European construction. In order to avoid parallel, complex and obscure politics, it
is probably right to define their place, weight, influence and competences formally.NOTES
1 The establishment of this Fund did not arise from merely regional motives. It must be seen as an attempt
(spurred on by the United Kingdom, the new member state) to bring about a rearrangement of the financial
benefits. Since the United Kingdom would be an important netto-contributor, it insisted on some kind of
refunding of the invested resources. It has been argued (not without reasons) that the establishment of the
European Fund for Regional Development must not be seen as an attempt to diminish the regional economical
and structural disparities, but as a project to refund the central governments of some member states. See a.o.
Engel, Van Ginderachter 1993: 36.
2 Typical examples are the Council of Communes and Regions of Europe (closely associated with the Council of
Europe) and (since 1985) the Council (later Assembly) of European Regions (Keating 1995: 15; Greenwood
1997: 225).
3 E.g. the Alpine groups, some coastal regions, …
4 A well known example are the so called Four Motors.
5 See a.o. Newman 1997; Négrier 1997. It has even been argued that decentralization is nothing but a defensive
reflex of the central state to protect its most important prerogatives: difficult tasks have to be carried out by
regional governments, whereby [1] the central state will not be questioned and [2] this central state can focus on
what it considers its most fundamental tasks (fiscal policy, foreign policy, …) (Keating 1995: 9-10; Castells
1997: 271-272).
6 See also: Berx 1995: 659.
7 Some regions do have the possibility to influence the European decision making in a formal but indirect way,
by their official involvement (consultation procedures and structures) in the preparation of the position of their
central state in the Council. See also Berx 1995: 663.
8 The Committee of the Regions (1996: 7-8) also states that “[i]ncreased decentralization of decisions to regional
and local authorities will increase the democratization process and offer more influence to the individual citizen.
[…] a decentralized system of government provides a better welfare for the citizens by ensuring the best possible
adaptation to local wishes and needs.”
9 Moreover, in the Committee of the Regions, NUTS 2 regions are represented as well as regions from the NUTS
1 level.
10 See also Jones 1995: 295.ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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